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March XX, 2005 
UB-I 
TO:	 AA/Center Director 
FROM:	 Chairperson, Mishap Investigation Board 
SUBJECT: VAB Fire, Mishap No. KSC-2005-XXX 
In accordance with your request on January 14, 2005, an investigation of the subject Mishap has 
been completed. The Mishap Investigation Board has established a proximate cause, root causes, 
contributing factors, and significant observations, and recommend.s actions to prevent recurrence. 
The results of this investigation are respectfully transmitted herein. 
The investigation was conducted in accordance with NPR 8621. IA, "NASA Procedural 
Requirements for Mishap Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping", dated February 11, 
2004, and KDP—KSC-P-1474, "Mishap Investigation Board". Transmitted herein are Volumes I 
and II in final form. Voluthes III, "Corrective Action Plan", and Volume IV, "Lessons Learned 
Surnniary", will be completed'by InstitutionalSafety Division, SA-E. Volume V, "Witness 
Statements/Testimony", is transmitted to SA under separate cover. This volume consists of 
witness statements and taped interviews and will be made available to you if you need it for your 
review and approval of the report. 
Feel free to contact me at 867-6164 if I may be of any assistance to you during your review of 
this report. 
Ira Kight 
Enclosure
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Voting Members:	 _______________________ 
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SECTION III 
List of Members, Advisors, Observers, and Others 
NAME MAIL CODE BOARD POSITION 
•	 Ira Kight LTB-I Chairperson 
Steven Luciano PH-fl Voting Member 
Michael B. Stevens TA-G Voting Member 
W. Max Farley TA-D 1 Voting Member 
Bryce Collins op-os-jp Voting Member 
William C. Potteiger PH-O Voting Member 
Jod.i Levesque UB-C4 Voting Member 
Leon McGovern SGS Consultant 
Tracy Lee Belford CC-A Legal Advisor 
John Brand SA-F Ex-Officio
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SECTION IV 
Executive Summary 
On January 13, 2005, at approximately 1355, smoke was noticed on the 4th floor of D Tower in 
the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Subsequently, a 911 call was made, a fire alarm pull 
station was activated, and the VAB was evacuated. 
The source of the smoke was determined to be a fire on the Low Bay M/N section roof near the 
Launch Control Center (LCC) Crossover. A subcontractor to Space Gateway Support (SGS), 
Hamilton Roofing, Inc. (HRI), was perfomiing roof repairs in this area due to extensive wind 
damage during the 2004 hurricane season. 
SGS estimates the cost of the roof damage to be 52,500 or less, making this a Type D mishap. 
There were no injuries to personnel. Due to the high visibility of the mishap, the KSC Center 
Director appointed a Mishap Investigation Board. Damage to government property was limited 
to the roof and a small number of ceiling tiles that were damaged by the fire fighters during the 
response. At the time of the mishap, there were hazardous commodities in the VAB including 
Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) with open grain due to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) igniter 
inspectiolis. 
The Board agrees with the SGS Fire Services' theory that large amounts of smoke concentrated 
in the VAB D Tower and moved downward into the cable tunnel. Smoke detector alarms and 
the corresponding time of the alarms confirmed that smoke began in D Tower and moved 
downward to the cable tunnel under the transfer aisle between D Tower and A Tower. The wind 
blew the smoke from underneath the Low Bay M/N section roof surface inside the parapet wall 
to the 4th floor of D Tower near the LCC turnstile. The wind created a negative pressure in the 
building which worked as a vacuum to draw the smoke from the fourth floor of D Tower near the 
LCC turnstile westward toward the vertical electrical chase and then downward to the cable 
tunnel between D Tower and A Tower. 
Dense smoke in the cable tunnel was initially thought to be the result of an electrical fire in the D 
Tower cable tunnel. Even after the roof fire was located, fire fighters still believed that there was 
fire somewhere in the cable tunnel and remained focused there throughout the fire response. 
Only after the roof fire was extinguished did smoke in the cable tunnel begin to subside. 
The Board determined the proximate cause of this incident to be torching. HRI was installing a 
torch applied roof membrane which resulted in the ignition of combustible materials under the 
membrane near a wooden roof expansion joint.
The torch applied roofing method is a universally accepted safe industry practice when applied to 
non-combustible surfaces. The combination of an open flame torch and combustible materiaLs 
presents an increased level of risk even with skilled applicators. The addition of high winds to 
this combination result.s in a risk the Board thinks can not be adequately mitigated. An 
appropriate risk assessment and analysis must be perfom-ied on the proposed roofing method to 
be used on high visibility facilities which represent unique national assets even when using 
common industry practices for repair and modification. 
The Board identified three root causes which contributed to or created the proximate cause and, 
if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the mishap: 
1. Combustible materials in existing roof system 
2. Wind speed and direction 
3. Inadequate fire watch technique 
Two contributing factors were identified which may have contributed to the occurrence but, if 
eliminated or modified, would not have prevented the occurrence: 
1. HRI rushed to dry in and seal the roof on January 13 because heavy rain was 
predicted for the next day 
2. No guidance on torching in windy conditions 
A total of 17 significant observation.s were noted during thi.s investigation, which could lead to 
another mishap, or increase the severity of a mishap, but were not contributing factor.s in this 
mishap. These included: the difficulty in removing power from D Tower in a timely manner 
which required electricians to enter the VAB and proceed to D Tower 10th floor and E Tower 
11th floor to secure power after the evacuation; SGS observed HRI roofers working within a 
controlled acces.s zone beyond the protective barrier with no safety watch (and took no action); 
HRI did not consistently perform a fire watch as required each time torching was completed; a 
functioning disposable lighter was found on the M/N section roof by the fire investigators; and 
SGS Fire Services has little or no insight into hot work permits issued by United Space Alliance 
(USA). 
A complete list of findings and observations is enclosed in Section VIII.
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SECTION V 
Method of Investigation, Board Organization, and/or Special 
Circumstances 
The Board convened on Friday, January 14, 2005, to discuss roles and responsibilities and the 
course of action for the investigation. The Board determined that it required two additional 
voting members. The Board Chair requested and obtained concurrence for this additional 
support through the Director of Safety and Mission Assurance. 
The Board immediately requested and reviewed written witness statements from the USA Access 
Control Monitors (ACMs), USA VAB Site Safety representatives, HRI employees, SGS Fire 
Services personnel, the SGS construction surveillance inspector, and the USA Power Console 
Operator. The Mishap Board also requested and reviewed daily activity logs from the SGS 
surveillance construction inspector, the NASA Test Director (NTD), the Chief Test Conductor 
(CTC), the Orbiter Test Conductor (OTC), USA safety, USA electrical, and SGS electrical. 
Discussions with tho.se involved in the incident began with representatives of SGS Fire Services 
and USA VAB Site Safety. These representatives provided an overview of the activities related 
to the event. Site visits to the scene occurred on both January 14, 2005 and January 19, 2005. 
Photos were taken irninediately after the mishap and during the investigation to visually 
document the area and to facilitate the development of possible scenarios to help establish 
proximate causes, root causes, contributing factors, and significant observations. 
The SGS Deputy Fire Chief and several SGS Fire Services personnel who responded to the fire 
provided an informational walk down of the fire response areas including the mishap site. 
Informal discussions were held with the USA VAB Site safety representative, the SGS Manager 
for Construction Services, and the SGS Director of Engineering Services. 
The Board Chairperson, the Ex-Officio, and other voting members performed formal interviews 
with personnel directly involved in the roofing activity that led to the mishap. Those interviewed 
were HRI personnel who were working on the site, including the owner, foreman, two roofing 
material applicators/laborers, and the SGS construction surveillance inspector. The interviews 
commenced Tuesday, January 27, 2005 and were completed on Wednesday, February 2, 2005. 
During the formal interviews the questions and witness statements were recorded 
During the witness interview process, the Board asked questions regarding project safety 
training, schedule, procedures, processes, reference documents, personnel assignments, and other 
relevant information. This line of questioning was prompted by data gathered during preliminary
fact-finding, review of written witness statements, photos of the site taken before and after the 
Board was convened, the Board ts observations of the event site, and conversations with 
personnel involved in events leading up to the mishap. 
The Board acquired and listened to Operational Intercommunication System (OI .S) voice tapes 
for channels 232 (CTC command) and radio nets 1105 (safety), 110 (pad leader), 116 
(fire/rescue), and 216 (fire/rescue). The Board also acquired and listened to the taped 911 fire 
reporting call. 
In the course of the investigation, the Board reviewed pertinent documents provided by National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), USA, SGS and HRI. These documents 
included contract documentation including HRI's Safety Plan, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) regulations, facility and engineering drawings, construction surveillance 
inspector daily logs, burn permits, electrical switching orders, HRI's daily logs, NPR, KNPR, 
KDPs and other relevant documents. 
The Board systematically and logically analyzed the physical process and operational aspects of 
the events surrounding the mishap. SGS, Director of Engineering Services, was tasked to 
provide a preliminary cause-effect analysis. The Board revised and updated this analysis and 
incorporated final results into Section VII of this report.
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SECTION VI 
Narrative Description of Mishap 
S ummarv 
On January 13, 2005, at approximately 1355, smoke was noticed on the 4' floor of D Tower in 
the VAB. Subsequently, a 911 call was made, a fire alarm pull station was activated, and the 
VAB was evacuated. 
The source of the smoke was determined to be a fire on the Low Bay M/N section roof near the 
LCC Crossover. HRI, a subcontractor to SGS, was performing roof repairs in this area as a 
result of extensive wind damage during the 2004 hurricane season. HRI was installing a torch 
applied roof membrane which resulted in the iunition of combustible materials under the 
membrane near a wooden roof expansion joint. 
Description of Facility 
Construction of the VAB at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) was completed in 1965 for assembly 
of Saturn V launch vehicles for the Apollo Program and was later modified to support vehicle 
stacking operations for the Space Shuttle Program.
TCK 0	 U	 L.J	 r,' 
.. I,	 ...,, .0 
________ 
uLJi J 
-- .=
The VAB, one of the largest buildings in the wodd,cover.s 8 acres and is 525 feet high, 716 feet 
long, and 518 feet wide. Enclosing 129,428,000 cubic feet, the building consists of two main 
areas containin g
 the Low Bays and the High Bays, with a Transfer Aisle running north/south up 
the middle. High Bays 1 and 3 are integration cells used to stack the Solid Rocket Boosters 
(SRBs) on Mobile Launcher Platforms (MLPs), mate the External Tank (ET) to the SRBs, and 
mate the Orbiter to the ET. The completed Shuttle vehicle i checked and then rolled out to the 
launch pad using a Crawler Transporter (CT). High Bay 2 is used as a Safe Haven in which a 
stacked Shuttle vehicle, rolled back from the pad, can be stored for hurricane protection in the 
event both High Bays 1 and 3 are occupied by other vehicles being assembled. High Bay 4 is 
used for temporary storage of an Orbiter that has to be removed from the Orbiter Processing 
Facility (OPF) to permit preventative maintenance or modification work in the open bay. Two 
stand alone ET storage and checkout cells are located in both High Bay 2 and High Bay 4 (two in 
each bay). Six towers containing office and storage space are located on each side of the High 
Bays. They are designated Towers A, B, C, D, E, and F. In spite of the enormous amount of 
office space available, only a few hundred personnel are actually allowed to be housed in the 
VAB due to the hazard posed by over two million pounds of propellant contained in the SRBs on 
each Space Shuttle. The Low Bay area is the southern part of the building and serves as a 
holding and processing area for the SRB Forward Assemblies and sometimes Aft Skirts. The 
Low Bay also houses office areas designated as the K, L, M, and N sections. USA's main 
intranet and computer systems for data processing and data communication are located there. A 
crossover bridge connects the LCC with the VAB, Tower D, providing utility connections and a 
personnel walkway. 
VAB Electrical 
The VAB electrical system consists of multiple medium voltage (13.8KV) feeders running from 
the Utility Annex (UA) to the VAB, specifically to Tower A (2 floor) and Tower D (4th floor). 
It is then further distributed to the respective low voltage substations (480/277V) by several other 
load break switches. All medium voltage switches are manually operated. With exception of 
two low voltage Unit Substations (USS-8l6 Low Bay West and USS-800 Tower A l0t1 floor) all 
substations are manually operated. The USA Power Console monitors most of the manually 
operated substations through the Kennedy Cdmplex Control System (KCCS). This provides 
open/close indications of the substation breakers and in some cases voltage indications. The 
newer double-ended substations are of the automatic type which, if power is lost from one of the 
primary feeds, open the respective side main breaker and close the tie breaker, thus restoring 
power to the side affected. When power is restored the substation returns to the normal 
configuration automatically. This scheme is controlled by a local Programmable Logic 
Controller (PLC), and the secondary mains are controllable through KCCS from the Power 
Console. These substations also provide a myriad of information including status, voltage, 
current, power, demand, harmonics, etc. 
The VAB substations are classified as either industrial or emergency types. An emergency 
substation is one that is backed-up by the CS sub-station generator-s. These generators are 
designed and tested to come on line in less than 10 seconds in ca.e of a loss of Florida Power and 
Light power in order to comply with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Life 
Safety Code emergency power requirements. Thus, emergency substations feed emergency
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lighting, life safety circuitry and flight hardware/critical systems. There are a total of 12 
emergency substations (single feed) in the VAB. Load Break Switch 729 (Tower A, 7nd floor) 
feeds all emergency substations in the VAB and USS-821B at the LCC, plus any emergency 
power inside the MLP if it is docked at any of the High Bays. 
An industrial substation is one connected to a feeder not backed-up by the C5 substation 
generators. There are a total of 1 3 industrial substations (double-ended), not including those 
used when an MLP is docked in a High Bay. These are fed from several load break switches. 
In addition, there is an Uninterruptible Power System (UPS) in the Low Bay West area supplying 
power to the Shuttle Processing Data Mana gement System (SPDMS)/USA Business Systems 
and the Photo Analysis Lab. This UPS is composed of 2 redundant 300kW units (UPS-7 & 
UPS-8) each with its own input feed, one from USS-800 and the other from USS-8 1 6. These 
units are monitored through KCCS. 
VAB Fire Mishap
On November 12, 2004, subcontraci. 
X05503 was awarded to HRI, 
through the SGS Subcontracts 
Administration Office, to provide 
demolition and removal of the 
existing bitumen roof system in its 
entirety. HRI was to supply and 
install a new 3-ply SBS modified 
bitumen roof system as listed 
below: 
Task 1: LCC Crossover Roof Area 
Task 2: M/N Roof Replacement 
Task 3: 16th floor Door Pocket 
Roof Replacement. 
A Notice to Proceed was issued at the pre-work conference held November 12, 2004. This 
project replaces the roof sections as described above which were damaged during the 2004 
hurricane season. 
HRI submitted safety plans and received approval from SOS during the period from November 
17, 2004 to December 16, 2004. Demolition of the M/N section of the VAB low bay roof began 
in mid December, 2004. 
On January 11, 2005, USA VAB Site Safety issued burn permit # VAB 05-0 19 to allow HRI to 
perform torching operations necessary to install new bitumen roofing membrane. The permit 
allowed open flame torching on the roof during the week of January 12, 2005 through January 
18, 2005.
On January 12, 2005, HRI cleaned, primed and flashed the combustible wood roof expansion 
joint that runs east-to-west across the roof area. This provided a protective covering over the 
expansion joint. 
On January 13, 2005, at 0810, a wind warning was issued forecasting steady state winds at 18 
knots from 140 degrees. 
At 0824, a KCCS outage was opened and servers were all taken off line at 0905. All remote 
visibility to electrical power was lost at this time. 
At approximately 0830, HRJ personnel began work on the M/N section of the VAB roof. The 
work planned for that day included the use of torches in multiple locations. Three HRI 
employees were present throughout the morning and one of the owners of the company was on 
site for the early part of the morning. Torching work was done throughout the morning on the 
east parapet wall and near the combustible wood roof expansion joint that runs east-to-west 
across the roof area, but not directly on wood roof expansion joint which was protected b y two 
layers of bitumen roofing membrane 
(installed the previous day). 	 !'Z 
At 1005, a wind warning was suei 
forecasting gusts of 35 kinis cr 
higher from 140 degrees. 
At approximately 1030, HRJ 
personnel made the decision 
work due to hi gh winds. Shortly 
thereafter HRJ personnel allegec\ 
left the roof for an early lunch. 
The Board was unable to dete1m: 
when HRI peisonnel left, or the 
exact time that they returned to the 
roof. The Board believes that the roofers returned to the roof some time between 111 and 1130. 
Once they returned to the roof additional torching was performed, but not in the area where the 
fire occurred. 
At approximately 1330, HRI personnel made the decision to leave the site for the day based on 
the prediction of continued inclement weather. 
At 1355, a USA ACM noticed smoke on the VAB 4t floor of D Tower. The fairly new 
employee notified the ACM office via radio net 110. A second ACM responded to D Tower and 
made a 911 call from the phone near the 4th floor turnstiles initiating the fire response. The 
remainin g ACM in the ACM office contacted the USA VAB Site Safety representative, who 
instructed the ACM to pull the fire alanm The ACM office representative requested Safety 
assistance in positively identifying the smoke, thinking it could possibly be dust from 
sandblasting.
At 1358, the fire crew departed Station 2, heading to the VAB. The Joint Communication 
Control Center (JCCC), room LCC 1PIO, reported to the CTC and Safety Console in LCC 
Control Room 3 that the fire crew was responding to VAB D Tower due to a 911 call reporting 
smoke. 
At approximately 1400, SGS Fire Services personnel arrived on the scene and established 
Incident Command. Fire fighters noted smoke in the transfer aisle of the VAB and requested 
evacuation of the VAB. 
At 1401, a USA VAB Site Safety representative arrived in D Tower and, after verifying the 
presenceof smoke, activated the pull station on the 3 floor in N section, causing the fire alarm 
bells to ring throughout the VAB and initiating the evacuation. 
At 1406, to reinforce the need to evacuate, the Fire Incident Commander instructed the CTC to 
activate the evacuation warbler. 
At 1412, the first smoke detector alarm was received at LCC 1 P10, (JCCC), from room 4D 10 of 
D Tower. 
At 1425, SGS Fire Services personnel reported visible smoke coming into the transfer aisle from 
the 3' and 4th floors of D Tower. 
At 1426, a second smoke detector alarm was received at the JCCC, from the D Tower cable 
tunnel. 
At 1432, a third smoke detector alarm was received at the JCCC, from the A Tower cable tunnel. 
At 1433, the Fire Incident Commander requested power to be shut off to D Tower. 
Firefighters continued to search for a source of the fire in all areas of D Tower and in adjoining 
spaces with main emphasis on the cable tunnel. Fire fighters remained convinced there was an 
electrical fire in the D Tower cable tunnel. Because smoke typically rises from the lowest point, 
the dense smoke in the tunnel strengthened their theory that the fire source was in the tunnel. 
At 1436, firefighters inspected the east Low Bay M/N roof and LCC crossover areas and 
reported no evidence of fire. 
At approximately 1450, USA and SGS electricians arrived at Incident Command and were 
escorted by fire fighters to the 10th floor of D Tower and the 1 1th floor of E Tower to secure 
power. 
At 1456, mutual aid was requested from Titusville and Patrick Air Force Base (PAFB) to backfill 
KSC Fire Stations.
UJ 
At 1500, USA electricians opened USS-806 secondary main breakers 3B & 9B, and USS-876 
secondary main breaker 3 on the 10th floor of D Tower. 
At 1506, a fire enine and fire fighting personnel from Titusville arrived at KSC fire station 4 in 
response to a mutual aid request. 
At 1510, KCCS servers were brought back online. 
At 1511, fire fighting personnel from PAFB arrived at CCAFS fire station I in response to a 
mutual aid request. 
At 1513, USA electricians opened USS-878 secondary main breaker 3 on the 11 floor of E 
Tower. 
Fire fighters reported lights still on in the cable tunnel. 
Fire fighters continued to 
search for the source of smoke 
and returned to the M/N 
section of the Low Bay roof 
At approximately 15 16, fire 
fighters found a small section 
of the roof glowing near the 
parapet wall. Upon further 
investigation, the fire fighters 
confirmed that there was a fire 
beneath the roofing 
membrane. Fire fighters 
began to extinguish the fire on 
the roof while other fire 
fighters continued to search 
for an additional fire source in 
the cable tunnel area.
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At 1538, USA electricians 
opened US S-8 16 secondary main breakers lB & 9B to remove additional power to the M/N 
section because fire fighters reported that they were receiving shocks while digging on the roof 
At 1545, the Fire Incident Commander requested electricians to return to Incident Command. 
The Fire Incident Commander was concerned that power was still not completely secured in D 
Tower and considered removing all power from the VAB. 
At 1549, fire fighters reported that an electrical cabinet in the D Tower tunnel was showing hot 
on the Infrared imaging gun.
At 1600, the Fire [ncident Con-u-nander requested to CTC that all power to the East side of the 
VAB be secured. 
At 1605, USA power console, in response to prior request to secure remaining power to M/N 
section, requested permission from the CTC to secure USS-870, breaker 7 in A Tower which 
would remove emergency power from the Low Bay. 
At 1606, the CTC advised the electricians to coordinate with the Fire Incident Commander for 
removal of emergency power. 
At 1613, SGS electricians secured Load Break Switch LBS-729 by opening Vacuum Fault 
Interrupt VFI-762/V1 at the Utility Annex (UA), removing power from all emergency 
substations in the VAB and eliminating the need to open USS-870, breaker 7. 
At 1615, the fire on the M/N section roof was declared extinguished. 
At 1616, the entire East side of the \'AB. was powered down bySGS electricians at the UA by 
opening Sub.station SS7O1/ACB3 and SS703/ACB3. However, fire fighters continued to report 
that the lights remained on in the cable tunnel. 
At 1619, soon after the fire was declared extinguished on the M/N section roof, the fire fighters 
re-entered the cable tunnel and reported that the smoke was beginning to dissipate. 
At 1623, fire fighters reported no more smoke in cable tunnel. 
At 1630, fire fighters reported that M/N section roof operations were completed and that the fire 
fighters were leaving the roof. 
At 1632, fire fighters continued searching fo a connection between the roof fire and the dense 
smoke in the cable tunnel. 
At 1637, OV-104 (Atlantis) was powered down as a precaution against possible power anomalies 
related to elebtrical switching activities. 
At 1648, OV-103 (Discovery) was powered down as a precaution against possible power 
anomalies related to electrical switching activities. 
At 1651, the Fire Incident Commander declared that no further power needed to be removed 
from the VAB. 
At 1652 and 1 659, respectively, mutual aid responders from Titusville and PAFB Fire 
departments were released. 
At 1703, a thermal scan of the M/N section roof and the ceiling below by the fire fighters 
revealed no more evidence of hot spots in these areas.
At 1 806, the Fire Incident Commander declared the VAB as fire safe and released the VAB to 
SGS security. 
At 1816, the Fire Incident Commander, the NASA Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), and the 
Chief of Fire Prevention made an initial assessment of the fire scene. 
At 1826, the USA VAB Site Safety representative, the NASA Shuttle Safety supervisor, the SGS 
Director of Engineering Services, and the HRI Co-Owner were escorted by the Chief of Fire 
Prevention to the M/N section roof for evaluation of the fire scene to determine how to 
temporarily secure the roof. 
At 1840, HRI was allowed to make temporary repairs to prevent water intrusion from anticipated 
rain storms that were approaching the area. 
At 1930, the NASA Mishap Investigation Board chair was selected by KSC Center Director. 
At 2000, a meeting was held to discuss restoration of power, return to operations, securing all 
areas penetrated by fire fighters, and extent of the impoundment area. 
At 2107, USA/SGS electricians returned to the VAB to begin power restoration. 
At 2240, power-up of OV- 103 (Discovery) was initiated. 
At 2247, all power was restored to the VAB. 
At 2258, the VAB was reopened for limited work access. 
At 2304, power-up of OV- 103 (Discovery) was completed. Note: OV- 104 (Atlantis) was not 
powered-up until the next morning due to a lack of manpower on 3 shift. 
At 2330, the VAB was reopened for normal work. 
On Friday, January 14, 2005, Mr. James Kennedy, KSC Center Director, appointed a Mishap 
Investi gation Board to investigate the incident, determine the root cause, and make 
recommendations to prevent recurrence of this mishap. 
The Mishap Investigation Board convened at the site of the incident at 0930 on Friday, January 
4, 2005. 
Related Events 
The power-down of OV- 103 (Discovery) and OV- 104 (Atlantis) had no apparent impact on the 
overall Shuttle processing schedule for return to flight.
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SECTION VII 
Data Analysis 
Introduction 
Data was analyzed to determine the proximate and root causes and contributors to the mishap. 
The analysis was approached systematically through utilization of a timeline and a cause-effect 
diagram. The primary sources of data were fire fighters, HRI personnel, personal observations 
by the Board members, HRI's Safety Plan, contract documentation, and OSHA regulations. 
Additional sources included facility and engineering drawings, construction surveillance 
inspector daily logs, burn permits, electrical switching orders and HRI daily logs. 
Fire Analysis and. Theoiy 
No direct torching of exposed combustibles was performed on the day of the fire, January 13, 
2005. A new membrane had been torched to the wood expansion joint a day earlier, January 12, 
2005. However, torching was performed in the corner where the expansion joint butts against 
the parapet wall to seal the flashing to the parapet. An existing cover had been attached to the 
parapet wall up to the expansion joint prior to the fire. The parapet cover was removed by the 
fire fighters while extinguishing the fire. The parapet cover may have served as a conduit for the 
transfer of flame and heat to combustible materials located in the wood expansion joint and the 
non-contracted roof section on the opposite side of the expansion joint. 
The Board agrees with the SGS Fire Services' theory that large amounts of smoke concentrated 
in the VAB D Tower and moved downward into the cable tunnel. Smoke detector alarms and 
the corresponding time of the alarms confirmed that smoke began in D Tower and moved 
downward to the cable tunnel under the transfer aisle between D Tower and A Tower. The wind 
blew the smoke from underneath the Low Bay M/N section roof surface inside the parapet wall 
to the 4th1 floor of D Tower near the LCC turnstile. The ivind created a negative pressure in the 
building which worked as a vacuum to draw the smoke from the fourth floor of D Tower near the 
LCC turnstile westward toward the vertical electrical chase and then downward to the cable 
tunnel between D Tower and A Tower.
Detailed Timeline 
A detailed timeline was constructed in order to identify events related to the mishap. It begins 
with award of SGS subcontract for various roof repairs as the result of hurricane damage, 
included fire response events, and ends with the convening of the Mishap Investigation Board. 
Date Time VEvent	 I 
11/12/04 ________ J SGS awarded roof repair contract to Hamilton Roofing, Inc (HRI) } 
11/12/04 I_________ Notice to Proceed issued / Pre-work conference held	 - 
11/17/04 ________ HRI Safety Plan submitted 
11/23/04 ________ SGS approved HRJ Safety Plan 
12/12/04 ________ HRI Accident Plan and other safety plans submitted 
12/1 6/04 ________ SGS approved all HRI-submitted plans 
1/11/05 USA VAB Site Safety issued burn permit VAB 05-0 19 for hot 
_________ ________ work during the period January 12 - January 18, 2005 
1/12/05 ________ HRI cleaned, primed, and flashed wood expansion joint 
1/13/05 0810 Wind warning issued forecasting steady state 18 knots at 140 
___________ _________ degrees 
1/13/05 0824 Outage 546517 opened for loss of KCCS due to server relocation 
1/13/05 0830 HRT torch work on M/N section roof began for day (flashing 
__________ _________ parapet) 
1/13/05 1005 Wind warning issued for gusts 35 knots or higher at 140 degrees 
1/13/05 1030* Decision to stop work due to high winds; HRI personnel left the 
_________ _________ roof 
1/13/05 1130* HRI returned to the roof (torching membrane over anchor plates 
_________ ________ away from parapet and expansion joint) 
1/13/05 1330* HRI left site for the day 
1/13/05 1355 - While conducting routine shift walkdown of D, E, and F Towers, 
1357 a VAB ACM noticed smoke on the 4th Floor of D Tower. He 
contacted the ACM office on radio net 110. A second ACM 
quickly joined the first, in D Tower and made a 911 call from the 
phone near the 4th Floor turnstiles. The remaining VAB ACM in 
the ACM office contacted USA VAB Site Safety and reported 
smoke on the 4t) Floor of D Tower. USA VAB Site Safety 
instructed him to pull fire alarm, but he requested Safety to assist 
in positively identifying smoke since he thought it could be dust 
_________ ________ from sandblasting. 
1/13/05 1358 KSC fire crew departed fire station 2 for VAB 
JCCC, LCC room lPlO, reported to CTC and Safety Console in 
LCC Control Room 3 that Fire Services was responding to VAB, 
D Tower, due to a 911 call reporting smoke. 
1/13/05 1400* Fire crew on site, smelled smoke in transfer aisle and requested 
VAB evacuation
1/13/05 1401 USA VAB Site Safety arrived in D Tower, verified smoke, and 
pulled fire alarm on 3	 Floor, N Section of Low Bay, activating 
_________ ________ fire bells throughout VAB 
1/13/05 1406 Fire Incident Commander instructed CTC to activate warbler for 
__________ _________ evacuation 
1/13/05 1412 JCCC, LCC room IP1O, reported smoke detector activation in 
_______ _______ room 4D10 
1/13/05 1425 SOS Fire Services reported visible smoke coming into the 
_________ Transfer Aisle from the 3rd and 4th floors of D Tower 
1/13/05
________ 
1426 JCCC, LCC room 1P1O, reported smoke detector activation in D 
__________ _________ Tower Cable Tunnel 
1/13/05 1432 JCCC, LCC room 1PIO, reported smoke detector activation in A 
_________ ________ Tower Cable Tunnel 
1/13/05 1433 Fire Incident Commander requested electricians to shut off power 
_________ ________ to D Tower. 
1/13/05 Fire fighters continued to search for the source of the fire in all 
areas of D Tower and in adjoining spaces with main emphasis on 
___________ _________ the cable tunnel. 
1/13/05 1436 Firefighters inspected east Low Bay roof and LCC Crossover and 
reported no problems __________ 
1/13/05
_________ 
1450* USAISGS electricians arrived at Incident Command and were 
escorted by fire fighters to the 10th floor of D Tower and the 1 1tl 
floor of E Tower to secure power. 
1/13/05 1456 Mutual aid was requested from Titasville and PAFB 
1/13/05 1500 USA electrician opened USS-806 secondary main breakers 3B 
and 9B and USS-876 secondary main breaker 3 on the 10th floor 
of D Tower. 
1/13/05 1506 Fire engine and fire fighting personnel from Titusville arrived at 
_________ ________ KSC fire station 4 
1/13/05 1510 KCCS servers were brought back on line 
1/13/05 1511 Fire fighting personnel from PAFB arrived at CCAFS fire station 
1/13/05 1513 USA electrician opened USS-878 secondary main breaker 3 on 
the 1 1th floor ofE Tower 
1/13/05 Fire fighters reported lights still on in the cable tunnel. 
Fire fighters continued to search for the source of smoke and 
returned to the M/N section of the Low Bay roof. _________ 
1/13/05
________ 
1516* Fire discovered on roof MIN section and extinguishment begun. 
1/13/05 1538 USA electrician opened USS-8l6 secondary main breaker lB and 
9B becau.se
 fire fighters reported that they were experiencing 
shocks while digging on the roof. _________ 
1/13/05
________ 
1545 The Fire Incident Commander requested that electricians return to 
Incident Command. The Fire Incident Commander was 
concerned that power was still not completely secured in D Tower 
_________ ________ and considered removing all power from the VAB.
1/13/05 1549 Fire fighters reported that the infrared imager showed a hot 
__________ cabinet in tunnel. 
1/13/05
________ 
1600 Fire Incident Commander requested that all power to the ea.st side 
_________
of the VAB be secured 
1/13/05
________ 
1605 USA Power Console requested permission from CTC to secure 
USS-870/Breaker #7 in A Tower to remove emergency power 
_________
from the Low Bay. 
1/13/05
________ 
1606 CTC advised the electricians to coordinate with the Fire Incident 
__________
Commander for removal of emergency power. 
1/13/05
_________ 
1613 SGS electricians secured Load Break Switch LBS-729 by opening 
Vacuum Fault Interrupt VFI-762/V1 at the Utility Annex (UA), 
removing power from all emergency substations in the VAB and 
eliminating the need to open USS-870, breaker 7. _________ 
1/13/05
________ 
1615 Fire on MIN section roof declared extinguished. 
1/13/05 1616 The entire East side of the VAB was powered down by SGS 
electricians at the UA by opening substation SS7O1/ACB3 and 
SS703/ACB3. However, fire fighters continued to report that the 
lights remained on in the cable tunnel. 
___________ 
1/13/05
_________ 
1619 Fire fighters re-entered the cable tunnel and reported that the 
smoke was beginning to dissipate. 
__________ 
1/13/05
_________ 
1623 Fire fighters reported no more smoke in cable tunnel. 
1/13/05 1630 Fire fighters reported that M/N section roof operations were 
completed and that the fire fighters were leaving, the roof. __________ 
1/13/05
_________ 
1632 Fire fighters continued searching for a. connection between the 
roof fire and the dense smoke in the cable tunnel. 
1/13/05 1637 OV-104, Atlantis, was powered down as a precaution against 
possible power anomalies related to electrical switching activities. __________ 
1/13/05
_________ 
1648 OV-103, Disc.overy, was powered down as a precaution against 
possible power anomalies related to electrical switching activities. ___________ 
1/13/05
_________ 
1651 Fire Incident Commander declared that no further power needed 
to be removed from the VAB. 	 - 
1/13/05 1652 Mutual aid support from Titusville was released 
1/13/05 1659 Mutual aid support from PAFB was released 
1/13/05 1703 Thermal scan of the M/N section roof and the ceiling below by 
the fire fighters revealed no more evidence of hot spots in these 
areas 
1/13/05 1806 The Fire Incident Commander declared the VAB as fire safe and 
released the VAB to SOS security. 
1/13/05
_________ 
1816 The Fire Incident Commander, the NASA Authority Having 
Jurisdiction (AHJ), and the SOS Chief of Fire Prevention made an 
initial assessment of the fire scene. 
1/i 3/05 1826 The USA VAB Site Safety representative, the NASA Shuttle 
.Safety supervisor, the SGS Director of Engineering Services, and 
the HRI Co-Owner were escorted to the M/N section roof by the 
SGS Chief of Fire Prevention for evaluation of the fire scene to 
determine how to temporarily secure the roof.
1/13/05 
__________
1840 
_________
HRJ allowed in to make temporary repair to prevent water 
intrusion from anticipated rain storms approaching the area 
1/13/05 1930 NASA Investigation Board Chair selected 
1/13/05 2000 
_________
Meeting held to discuss power restoration, return to operation, 
securing all areas penetrated by fire fighters, and extent of the 
impoundment area. 
1/13/05 I2107 USAISGS electricians re-entered VAB to restore power 
1/13/05 2240 Power up of OV-103. Discovery, was initiated 
1/13/05 2247 All power restored in VAB 
1/13/05 2258 VAB reopened for limited work access 
1/13/05 2304 Power up of OV-103, Discovery, was completed. 
1/13/05 2330 VAB re-opened for normal work 
1/14/05	 { ________ NASA Investigation Board activated
* Exact times could not be verified but are believed to be accurate. 
Cause - Effect Analysis 
In an effort to identify the proximate and root causes of this mishap, a cause - effect fishbone 
diagram was constructed (see Figure 1: cause - Effect Diagram). This diagram was used to 
ensure all potential cause categories were considered. The categories identified include: 
Design 
Safety Planning 
Human Factors 
Existing Conditions 
Weather 
Worker Training 
A general discussion of each category is provided below. 
Cause Category: Desin 
Torch-applied roojIng was specfIed in design: There are four roofing applications typically 
considered for'roofing projects by KSC. The applications are 
1. Hot Mopped Asphalt applied SBS Membrane 
2. Torch applied SBS Membrane 
3. Cold-Adhered Asphalt Emulsion applied SBS Membrane 
4. Liquid-applied Elastomeric coating (High pitched roofs (typically metal)) 
The SGS roof specification for each project considers the following design factors: 
1. First Cost and life-cycle (long-term) cost 
2. Energy Conservation opportunities 
3. Value and vulnerability of building components 
4. Required service life 
5. Climate 
6. Maintenance 
7. Availability of materials and competent applicators 
8. Local practices 
9. Building code fire resistance and wind uplift requirements 
10. Environmental factors 
The basic roof design of the low-slope roof system generally has three components: 
I.	 Structural deck 
2. Thermal insulation 
3. Membrane 
A hot mopped asphalt application has the following advantages: 
1. Excellent resistance to water penetration and extremely low water absorptive 
qualities. 
2. Durability under prolong exposure to weather. 
3. Good internal cohesion and adhesion.
4.	 Therrno-pla-sticity 
Produces superior lap seal. 
Safer than torching. 
Hot Mopping has some disadvantages, notably: 
1. The need for ancillary operations- preheating in a kettle, transport of hot 
asphalt to point. 
2. Greater slippage hazard attributable to use of softer, more fluid bitumen, 
producing thicker layers. 
A torch applied applic.ation ha-s the following advantages: 
1. Excellent resistance to water penetration and extremely low water absorptive 
qualities. 
2. Durability under prolong exposure to weather. 
3. Thermo-plasticity 
4. Generally faster than mopping 
5. Less slippage hazard than mopping 
6. No ancillary operations as required for mopping. 
Torching has some disadvantages, notably: 
1. Unless it is performed fast, it will produce poor adhesion. 
2. Greater chances of igniting combustibles. 
Produces poor lap seal due to the applicator using too little or too much heat. 
Cold Asphalt Emulsion and Liquid-apIied Elastomeric coating are referred to as cold processes 
and are generally less expensive and used for refurbishments and re-roofing. This technique is 
normally restricted to facility maintenance and repair programs of damaged built-up systems 
when it is uneconomiôal to bring in. heavy equipment, hot tar kettles, asphalt dispensers, etc. 
Based on the design factors listed above, the hot mopped solution would typically be selected for 
the M/N section roof. However, due to roof height, a. hot tar kettle would be required on the 
roof. SGS determined that this would have represented an unacceptable fire risk. Selection of 
the cold adhered or liquid coating would not provide adequate assurance of a reliable weather 
seal, and given the criticality of the facility, would not be acceptable. 
SGS selected the torch-applied method as it is a universally accepted safe application. In this 
case the system was typically being applied to non-combustible surfaces. The underlying roof 
layer was a 2" lightweight concrete surface and side edging (except for existing expansion joint) 
is comprised of concrete or metal surfaces. Industry has no restrictions on the application of 
torch-applied materials on wood surfaces; however does recommend the u-se of a protective 
barrier. SGS determined that the torch-applied system represented the best acceptable risk. 
The open flame torch, by providing a flame source on the roof to ignite combustibles, was 
determined to be the proximate cause and if eliminated would have prevented the mishap.
Limited consideration for work near combustibles was provided in the design: There are no 
typical restriction.s to the u-se of torch-applied roofing over wood; however, the introduction of 
direct flame to combustibles clearly represents an increase in risk. 
Note: If limited areas of combustibles are present, designs shall use a non-combustible 
covering or a first layer of cold-adhered roofing in those limited location-s to the extent 
feasible without compromising the integrity of the weatherproofing system and it-s 
warranty. 
No considercition for wind speed was included in specfIcations: The design specifications 
contained no guidance for torching operation-s in windy condition-s. Additionally, there is no 
known industry standard concerning wind. However, the wind speed and direction clearly 
contributed to the mishap. 
The lack of clear guidance or direction concerning wind speed pertaining to torching may 
have contributed to the mishap. 
Cause Cateaory: Safety Planning 
Fire Watch: A burn permit (VAB 05-019) was in place that specified there must be an on-site 
fire extinguisher and a fire watch during and after use of flame. The work crew visually checked 
the work site prior to leaving; however it is not certain when torching stopped and whether the 
fire watch was performed a-s required. Later, the area was aga.in visually inspecte .d by fire 
fighters, in response to fire alarm activation, but no evidence of fire was discovered. If the 
combustible area i-s fully visible, the fire watch, as specified in the permit, is a good requirement. 
However, if the construction process conceal.s the combustible material, as in this case, the visual 
inspection will not reveal all potential areas of combustible material ignition. The inadequate fire 
watch technique did not directly contribute to the combustible materials ignition, but did directly 
cause an increase in the consequences of the ignition via the extended duration of smoldering 
and smoke generation prior to discovery. 
The inadequate fire watch technique is considered to be a root cause. 
Cause Cate gory: Human Factors 
Excessive work hours by crew: No evidence of work crew fatigue were identified or reported. 
Mishap occurred early in the shift precluding impact from extended work -hours. 
Pressure to seal the opened roof area was a driver due to rain and winds reported as 
approaching: Sealing is required to ensure protection of a-sset-s within the facility. The sealing 
could have been affected by either completion of the work or placement of temporary mitigation 
(e.g., tarps). Due to elevation of roof and historically high wind speeds caused by the elevation 
and channeling of wind-s around the VAB, tarps were not considered a reliable patch and 
completion of work was highly desirable. 
The pressure to dry in and seal the roof may have contributed to the mishap.
Cause Cateeory: Existing Conditions 
Combustibles used in existing roofsystem: This is a reasonably expected condition on most 
existing roofs. However, the introduction of direct flame to combustibles clearly represented an 
increase in risk. 
The presence of combustibles is considered to be a root cause. 
Parapet systemprevented visual inspection: The existing parapet system provided a pathway for 
a wind driven oxygen source adjacent to the installed roofing and provided a visual obscured 
pathway for distribution of the combustion products into the VAB interior. It is not known 
whether the parapet contributed to the fire or the transfer of the smoke into the VAB. 
The parapet system is not considered to be a contributing factor. 
Cause Category: Weather 
Wind cooling of surfaces requii-ecf longer flame exposure to roof The cooling effect of the high 
winds required a longer application of the heat source. The extended exposure of the roofing 
materials to the heat source dramatically increased the potential for ignition. This is considered 
to be a direct contributor to the mishap. 
Wind changedflame path: The high winds redirected the nominal flame path and allowed flame 
impingement on areas not visible. The errant application of flame to combustible roofing 
materials dramatically increased the risk of an unseen ignition point. This is considered to be a 
direct contributor to the mishap. 
Wind direction: The high winds and parallel direction forced a wind driven oxygen source inside 
the roofing system or parapet system. The enriched oxygen environment helped to fan the fire 
and transfer smoke into the VAB. This is considered to be a direct contributor to the mishap. 
Wind speed and direction is considered to be a root cause.
Cause Cate gory: Worker Training 
Comp any Quciifications: The contract specifications required certification of the company and 
workers. Further, the Manufacturer's warranty required the company and worker-s be trained and 
certified by them for application of their roofing materials as a condition to providing the 
warranty. Soprema ® has certified that HRI has been certified to apply it-s products for over 10 
years. 
Training and qualification of the cotupany is not considered to be a contributing factor. 
Worker QuaijIcations: As stated above, worker training and qualification is required a-s well as 
company certification for torch applied systems. In addition to manufacturer certification in 
torch applied roofing, HRI workers are stated by HRI to have had safety awareness training that 
cover-s all aspects of roofing, On the Job Training in roofing and hold weekly project and work 
safety 'toolbox" meetings. 
Training and qualification of the worker is not considered to be a contributing factor.
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Documentation Review 
A review of RRJ training certifications revealed that all HRI personnel installing the VAB roof 
system were fully trained and certified to install torch applied roofing systems by the 
manufacturer, Soprema. 
A review of contract documentation including design specification, installation drawings, and 
manufacturer's specifications revealed the following inconsistencies: 
The specification required a fire watch for 60 minutes following the termination of torching 
operations. The burn permit required a 30 minute fire watch. HRI's safety plan did not address 
the fire watch. 
The specifications called for two water and two CO2 fire extingui.sher.s for use during the fire 
watch. The burn permit called for "Appropriate Type Fire Extinguishers on-site at all times." 
A review of contract documentation including design specification, installation drawings, and 
manufacturer's specifications revealed the following inadequacies: 
The solicitation required HRI to "...establi.sh wind restrictions..." for operations. These wind 
restrictions were primarily addressing safety of personnel. There is no requirement for 
addressing "wind speed" as it relates to or affects torching operations. The effect of wind speed 
on torching was not addressed in the special conditions or HRI's safety plan. 
Interim Restrictions 
The Board Chairman, with concurrence of the NASA AHJ, immediately required interim 
restrictions for torch applied modified bitumen roofing to be implemented as a condition of HRI 
resuming work at the VAB and other sites. Improper use of roofing materials and application 
equipment can result in severe burns, and/or other physical injury, as well as damage to property. 
SGS embraced these recommendations and implemented them to all SOS work. KSC Director 
of Safety and Mission Assurance has required the use of these interim restrictions in all areas of 
KSC until the VAB Fire Mishap Investigation is completed and the final KSC policy is 
established and implemented. 
The interim restrictions limit torching and require all torching to cease when winds exceed 15 
mph. Additionally, no torching is allowed within 3 feet of combustibles or areas where the 
presence of combustibles is not known. A glue and stick application or equivalent is to be used 
in these locations. 
The Board recommends the use of Infrared ([R) heat detection. gun to assist in the fire watch.
Additional Research Regarding Torch Applied Roofing Products 
In an effort to further document standard industry practices the Board researched via the internet 
and found the following inforniation from GAF, a major roofing manufacturer: 
Installation of torch-applied products creates the risk of fire, including smoldering fires. Torch-
applied products must be applied only by professional roofing applicators trained in proper torch 
application and safety procedures. Roofing applicators must follow current roofing safety 
requirements, procedures and specifications. Procedures and equipment that 'will be used must 
comply with all applicable code requirements. Knowledge of the building construction and 
HVAC and other roof systems must be obtained prior to installation of torch-applied products. 
All potentially combustible and flammable aspects of the buildings use and design that increase 
the risk of fire must be identified. A base sheet must be used between the roofing membrane and 
any combustible materials such as wood. Never apply flame directly to combustible materials 
or allow the flame to enter into hidden or protected areas that may contain combustible 
materials. A supervisor trained in torch safety must conduct external and internal fire watches 
during application and after the torches are shut down. The watches shall never be less than one 
hour and may need to be longer. Infrared scanning equipment must be used in the fire 
watch. One twenty lb Class ABC fire extinguisher must be kept within 10 feet of every torch 
operator. The above list is not a complete set of necessary safety requirements, procedures, and 
specifications. Train all personnel in-recommended application tecimiques. Train all personnel 
in fire prevention and extinguishing methods. Take precaution-s when working around 
combustible materials, such as gas lines for HVAC units, and in the presence of solvent-based 
products. Use caution to prevent burns and train personnel in first aid procedures. Comply with 
all applicable fire regulations regarding the storage and use of propane. 
URL: httj://www. af.corn/General/SearchSite.asp?Silo=CONT&App=&WS=GAF# 
Type "torch safety" in the search window 
Click on Search 
Click on the link What safety precautions are recommended? Video 
Click on the Safety Warning tab
NO. KSC-2005-0 18-00002 
SECTION VIII 
Findings, Root Causes, Observations, and Recommendations 
What Happened: Mishap 
VAB Low Bay MIN section roof was damaged as the result of a fire. 
Why it Happened: Proximate cause 
P1.0 Finding: 
An open flame torch was used on roofing operations at the combustible expansion joint. 
P 1.1 Recommendation: 
Eliminate the use of open flame torches when combustibles are present or when the 
presence of combustibles is unknown. On roofs that have combustibles present or where 
the presence of combustibles is unknown, use a peel and stick, hot mop, or other 
approved roofing system that does not involve open flame application nethod (e.g. 
flameless torch). A risk analysis shall be performed when open flame torching near 
combustibles can not be avoided. The benefiting Program shall concur with the risk 
analysis. 
What Contributed: Root causes 
Rl.0 Finding: 
Combustibles were located in and near the expansion joint of the VAB M/N roof section 
where torching was being perfotmed. 
('NOTE. The expansion joint consists of 2 wooden beams with an air gap between them. 
The torching operation ignited combustibles in or near the expansion joint which 
smoldered for a considerable time before ignition. Combustibles were also located in the 
non contracted portion of the roof on the opposite side of the expansion joint.) 
Rl.1 Recommendation: 
Eliminate the use of combustible materials for all new roof construction. When not 
feasible, a risk analysis shall be performed prior to specifying the use of combustible 
materials. The benefiting Program shall concur with the risk analysis. 
Ri .2 Recommendation: 
Repairs to existing roofs that have combustibles present shall designate removal of all 
combustibles. If removal is not feasible or the presence of combustibles is unknown, use
a peel and stick. hot mop, or other approved non torch applied roofing system. A risk 
analysis shall be performed when open flame torching near combustibles can not be 
avoided. The benefiting Program shall concur with the risk analysis. 
R 2.0 Finding: 
Wind speed and direction contributed greatly to the ignition of the combustibles at the 
expansion joint in three different ways: 
Torch Longer - The high winds cooled the material fa.ster causing the tOrch operator to 
heat the area and material longer and hotter, contributing to the ignition of the 
combustibles. 
Flame spread - The high wind spreads the flame, giving the torch operator less control of 
the flame direction, heating more of the surrounding area. 
Direction- The direction of high wind parallel with the parapet wall created a venturi 
effect in the parapet wall and provided increased oxygen to the fire. The high winds 
fanned the smoldering fire causing ignition of the combustibles under the bitumen roof 
near the expansion joint. 
(NOTE. Wind warning was issued at 8:10 a. in. forecasting 18 knot steadv state winds at 
140 degrees (southeast,). At 10:05 wind warning was issuedfor gusts 35 knots or higher 
at 140 degrees. HRI noted conditions on the roof were too winav to work at 1:30 p. in.) 
R2. 1 Recommendation: 
Torching operations shall be restricted during windy conditions. A NASA policy shall be 
developed to identify maximum allowable conditions. Contract specification-s shall be 
updated to reflect new policy. Policy shall specify use of an anemometer (wind meter) at 
the roof location to measure wind speed at the specific job site. 
R2.2 Recommendation: 
Contract specification shall require all contractors to submit a Safety Plan to include 
procedures and restrictions associated with combustibles and high winds. 
R3.0 Finding: 
A visual fire watch was inadequate to detect smoldering combustibles underneath the 
roofing material-s. 
R3.1 Recommendation: 
The use of an IR Infrared Thermometer Gun shall be incorporated into a fire watch where 
materials are not completely visible. Personnel shall be trained in the use of an IR gun. 
Readings shall be taken at completion of the torching operations, and an additional 
reading one hour after torching operations have ceased to ensure cooling is taking place. 
Personnel shall not leave roof till fire watch i-s complete.
What May Have Contributed: Contributin factors 
CI.0 Finding: 
HRI rushed to dry in and seal the roof prior to leaving the job site for the day to prevent 
water intrusion due to the prediction of heavy rain the next day. 
Cl .1 Recommendation: 
Contractors shall not compromise safety and health principles and practices. Pre-work 
conferences shall reinforce NASA commitment to safety. 
C2.0 Finding: 
There was no guidance in the solicitation and resulting contract concerning torching in 
windy conditions. 
C2. I Recommendation: 
See recommendation R2. 1. 
Sianificant Observations: 
01.0 Observation: 
There was difficulty in removing electrical power from the VAB D Tower in a timely 
manner. 
(NOTE: The Fire Incident Commander requested the removal of electrical power to D 
Tower when it was thought that the fire was located in the cable tunnel and could be 
electrical in nature. Electricians had to besent to the lOth Jloor of D Tower, 1 lthjloor of 
E Tower, and to the west side of the Low Bay to secure various electrical substations in 
an attenipt to secure all power to D Tower. Numerous attempts to remove power from D 
Tower resulted in approximately 3 hours to eventually remove power.) 
01.1 Recommendation: 
In an emergency, consideration shall be given to the removal of all VAB electrical power 
from the Utility Annex. USA Electrical and SGS Electrical shall develop power removal 
procedures for various emergency situations in the VAB and other facilities with complex 
power systems. The developed procedures shall be coordinated with SGS Fire Services 
personnel. 
01.2 Recommendation: 
As VAB substations are replaced, upgrade to remotely controlled substations to avoid 
manual switching. 
02.0 Observation: 
HRI roofers were observed by the SGS inspector working within a controlled access zone 
beyond a protective barrier along the M/N roof parapet without a safety monitor.
02.1 Recommendation: 
HRI shall be formally notified by the SGS subcontract administrator of the OSHA 
violation and requested to provide a corrective action plan to assure HRI personnel 
comply with OSHA fall protection requirements. Reference approved Subcontractor 
safety plan and OSHA CFR 1926.500-503 (OSHA requires a competent person be 
designated by the employer to monitor the safety of other employees while working 
inside a controlled access zone within 6 feet of the leading edge of a low-slope roof that 
is 6 feet or more above a lower level if workers are not wearing fall protection). 
03.0 Observation: 
The SGS construction surveillance inspector noted in his daily log that a safety monitor 
was not posted for protection of HRI roofers working within 6 feet of leading edge of 
roof and no corrective action was initiated by the inspector, his lead, or their supervisor. 
03.1 Recommendation: 
The SGS construction surveillance inspector shall immediately notify subcontractors on 
site of safety violations and stop work when appropriate. 
03.2 Recommendation: 
SGS shall follow internal procedures to assure leads and supervisors follow up with 
corrective action concerning daily log entries. ENG-P-0012, Construction Management 
Processes, shall be updated to reflect Leads' and Supervisors' responsibility to review 
daily logs and iflitiate appropriate action as required. 
04.0 Observation: 
HRI did not perform a 60 minute fire watch after conclusion of torching operation per 
contract. 
(NOTE: Because the spec ,fIed fire watch technique was inadequate (see finding R3. OS), 
this finding is not considered a contributing factor.) 
04.1 Recommendation: 
Contractors shall be formally notified by the appropriate contract administrator of any 
Fire Watch vio'ation and requested to provide a corrective action plan to assure that 
contractor personnel comply with Fire Watch requirements. The Fire Watch 
requirements shall be specifically addressed in pre-work conferences. 
05.0 Observation: 
A functioning disposable lighter was found on the M/N roof by the fire investigators after 
the fire was extinguished. 
(NOTE: The lighter was located on a section of the roof on which HRJ had recently 
completed v'ork. While there is no evidence that this in any way contributed to the cause 
of the fire, the presence of a lighter in the VAB is a direct violation ofposted signage and 
area access safety training in accordance with NSS 1740.12, Safety Standardfor 
Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics.)
05.1 Recommendation: 
Reinforce the compliance with area restrictions concerning possession of lighters within 
certain KSC facilities. For all construction contractor-s provide reinforcement during pre-
work conferences. 
06.0 Observation: 
Hot Work Permits are issued by USA Safety per Operating Procedure USA002872, 
Welding and Burn Permits, in Shuttle processing facilities with SGS Fire Services having 
little or no in-sight. 
06.1 Recommendation: 
Provide copies of USA Safety approved Hot Work Permits to SGS Fire Services at time - 
of issue. Both the SGS Fire Services Prevention Department a-s well as JCCC (Fire 
Dispatcher in LCC 1PIO) shall receive copies. 
06.2 Recommendation: 
USA Safety, or permit issuing authority, shall inspect all hot work sites daily for 
compliance with permit. 
07.0 Observation: 
Operating Procedure USAOO2-872, Welding and Burn Permits, does not provide complete 
instruction for USA Site Safety representative, SGS Fire Services, or contractors to 
provide fire watches for torching. 
(NOTE: Operating Procedure only covers lire watch requirements for welding.) 
07.1 Recommendation: 
Update Operating Procedure USA002872, Welding and Bum Permits, to include clear 
instructions for fire watch pertaining to all hot work including torching. 
08.0 Observation: 
HRI did not leave the work premises in a clean, neat, and workman like condition as 
required by contract. 
(NOTE: While there were no indications that the condition impeded the responders' 
ability to locate and extinguish the fire, roofing materials and supplies were relocated 
and stored in a more orderly fashion afier the fire was extinguished later the evening of 
the mishap.) 
08.1 Recommendation: 
HRI shall be formally notified by the SGS subcontract admini-strator of the job site 
condition and requested to provide a corrective action plan to assure that subcontractor 
personnel comply with contract requirement-s.
08.2 Recommendation: 
Construction surveillance inspectors shall be more proactive in assuring that 
subcontractors leave the work premises in a clean, neat, and workman like condition at 
the end of each workday. 
09.0 Observation: 
The ET/SRB Operations Center was not aware of the HRI torching operation on the Low 
Bay M/N section roof. 
(NOTE: The ET/SRB Operations Center, located on the JIrst floor of Tower A, is 
responsible for all integration within the VAB. The Board noted that integration of major 
VAB facility work with Shuttle processing activity is generally effective; however, smaller 
facility modfIcation projects, especially subcontractor work, lack visibility and 
integration. Historically by USA policy, the single focal point for all work in a Shuttle 
processing facility has always been the facility operations group (i.e. Operations Desk, 
Pad Leader, etc.).) 
09.1 Recommendation: 
The ET/SRB Operations Center in the VAB shall be notified of all work prior to starting 
and upon completion on a daily basis. In addition to notification of daily operations, all 
times for hot work shall be specifically identified. Contract provisions shall be added to 
ensure daily notifications. Pre-work conferences shall reinforce this requirement. 
010.0 Observation: 
The SGS construction surveillance inspector did not enforce contract specifications 
pertaining to the proper number and type of fire extinguishers. 
010.1 Recommendation: 
Contract specifications shall be enforced and/or revised. 
011.0 Observation: 
The KCCS was offline due to a planned outage which did not allow visibility to the status 
of electrical power in the VAB. 
011.1 Recommendation: 
None. No critical operations were identified requiring KCCS to be online. 
012.0 Observation: 
HRI did not submit and SOS did not request a detailed daily report on the progress of the 
work including inspection records, personnel on the work site, equipment used and 
weather conditions as required by contract. 
012.1 Recommendation: 
Contract requirements shall be enforced or updated.
013.0 Observation: 
Timing in the various SGS Fire Services logging. system-s was not consistent. 
(NOTE: Though not related to the mishap itself the various times for events associated 
with the mishap were inconsistent across the various SGS Fire Services electronic 
logging systems, such as the fIre alarm system, 911 emergency system, and the dispatcher 
log. The timing inconsistency between systems hindered the development of a time/me of 
events associated with the VAB fire.) 
013.1 Recommendation: 
All JCCC alarm and logging systems shall be synchronized on a frequent basis to 
maintain timing consistency. 
014.0 Observation: 
Fire Fighters noted that an electrical box in the D Tower cable tunnel was hot. 
(NOTE: Fire Fighters, working to locate possible sources of the heavy smoke in the D 
Tower cable tunnel noted that an electrical panel (box) was indicated as vemy hot on the 
infrared detector they were using to locate potential hot spots. The panel was also noted 
as being vefy hot to the touch.) 
014.1 Recommendation: 
Even though the electrical panel (box) in question may be exhibiting a normal heating 
condition due to high current conductors in the enclosure, electricians shall examine it to 
ensure that an unsafe condition does not exist. 
015.0 Observation: 
Fire Fighters reported that they were receiving electrical shocks while fighting the fire on 
the M/N Section roof which supported their theory of an electrical fire. 
015.1 Recommendation: 
Provide awareness that personal may receive mild electrical shocks after walking on, or 
coming in contact with recently installed static charged roofing membrane surface. 
016.0 Observation: 
The mutual aid agreements established with local area fire departments were utilized 
during the VAB roof fire and worked according to plan. PAFB and Titusville fire 
departments were requested to backfill KSC and CCAFS fire stations. 
016.1 Recommendation: 
None. 
017.0 Observation: 
The SGS solicitation and corresponding HRJ contract contained requirements that were 
not clearly defined.
017.1 Recommendation: 
SGS shall review and revise all solicitations and contracts to clarify requirements that 
have not been clearly defined and to correct inconsistencies that exist within contract 
documents. All NASA KSC and contractor organizations writing solicitations and 
contracts shall review their documents to ensure discrepancies are corrected.
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SECTION IX 
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
Authority
 Havina Jurisdiction (AHJ): The AHJ is the organization, office, or individual 
responsible for approving equipment, an installation, or a procedure. The AHJ's are to be 
designated for fire protection and explosives ,by the Center Director. The fire protection AHJ 
shall be a safety or fire protection professional. 
Cause: An event or condition that results in an effect. Anything that shapes or influences the 
outcome. 
Cause - Effect Fishbone Diagram: A graphic representation of the mishap or close call that 
shows the event (accident) on the right end of a large arrow, identifies the main categories of 
causes of the problem on branches emanating from the large arrow, and lists possible causes in 
the applicable area(s) of the chart to determine the most likely root causes. 
Condition: Any as-found state, whether or not resulting from an event, that may have safety, 
health, quality, security, operational, or environmental implications. 
Contractor Safety
 Plans: Written plans prepared by the contractor detailing the overall safety 
program that will cover the employees, equipment, and facilities used to fulfill the contract. 
Contributin Factor: An event or condition that may have contributed to the occurrence of an 
undesired outcome but, if eliminated or modified, would not by itself have prevented the 
occurrence. 
Controlled Access Zone: An area in which certain work may take place without the use of 
guardrail systems, personal fall arrest systems, or safety net systems and access to the zone is 
controlled. 
Corrective Actions: Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, equipment, facilities, 
resources, or material that result in preventing, minimizing, or limiting the potential for 
recurrence of a mishap. 
Event: A real-time occurrence describing one discrete action, typically an error, failure, or 
malfunction. Examples: pipe broke, power lost, lightning struck, person opened valve. 
Expansion Joint: A constructed joint in an assembly allowing for movement of that assembly in a 
controlled location, and in a controlled failure.
Findin g: A conclusion, positive or negative, based on facts established during the investigation 
by the investigating authorit y (i.e.. cause, contributing factor, and observation). 
F1a.shin: A continuous sheet of impermeable material used to prevent the infiltration of water 
into the interior of a building. Flashing may be made of metal, plastic, rubber, or imprenated 
paper. 
High Visibility
 (Mishaps or Close Calls): Those particular mishaps or close calls, regardless of 
the amount of property damage or personnel injury, that the Administrator, AAJOSMA, CD, 
Director, HQ Ops., or the Center SMA Director judges to possess a high degree of programmatic 
impact or public, media, or political interest including, but not limited to, mishaps and close calls 
that impact flight hardware, flight software, or completion of critical mission milestones. 
Leadin Edge: The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working 
surface (such as the deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof, decking, or formwork 
sections are placed, formed, or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an 'unprotected 
side and edge" during periods when it is not actively and continuously under construction. 
Lessons Learned: The written description of knowledge or understanding that is gained by 
experience, whether positive (such as a successful test or mission), or negative (such as mishap 
or failure.. 
Low-Slope Roof: A roof having a slope less than or equal to 4 in 12 (vertical to horizontal). 
Membrane: A sheet of material either built up or single ply which is impervious to the 
penetration of water. 
Observation: A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the investigation that did not 
contribute to the mishap or close call, but, if left uncorreöted, has the potential to cause a mishap 
or increase the severity of a mishap; or a factor, event, or circumstance that is positive and 
should be noted. 
Parapet: The projection of an exterior wall assembly above the roof. 
Property
 Damane: Damage to any type of government or civilian property, including, but not 
limited to, flight hardware, flight software, facilities, ground support equipment, and test 
equipment. 
Proximate Cause: The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed immediately 
before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, 
would have prevented the undesired outcome. Also known as the direct cause(s). 
Recommendation: An action developed by the investigation authority to correct the cause or a 
deficiency identified during the investigation. 
Root Cause: One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired outcome and, if 
eliminated or modified, would have prevented the undesired outcome. Typically, multiple root 
causes contribute to an undesired outcome.
Safety-Monitorina S ystem: A safety system in which a competent per-son is responsible for 
recognizing and warning employees of fall hazard-s. If it is impossible to perfonri the 
construction work using a conventional fall protection system (i.e., guardrail system, safety net 
system, or personal fall arrest system) or that it is technologically impossible to u-se any one of 
these system-s to provide fall protection, the employer can use alternative design.s, materials, or 
methods to protect against a hazard which the employer can demonstrate will provide an equal or 
greater degree of safety for employees than the methods, materials or design-s specified in the 
standard. 
SOPREMA: An international company specializing in the manufacture of elastomeric bitumen-
based waterproofing membranes for use in construction, civil engineering, and environmental 
protection. 
Tyne D Mishp: A mishap that caused any nonfatal OSHA recordable occupational injury and/or 
illness that doe-s not meet the definition of a Type C mishap, or a total direct cost of mission 
failure and property damage of at least $1,000 but less than $25,000. 
Unprotected Sides and Edaes: Any side or edge (except at entrances to points of access) of a 
walking/working surface, e.g., floor, roof, ramp, or runway where there is no wall or guardrail 
system at least 39 inches (1.0 rn) high. Each employee on a walking/working surface (horizontal 
and vertical surface) with an unprotected side or edge which i-s 6 feet (1 .8 m) or more above a 
lower level shall be protected from falling. 
Warning
 Line S ystem: A balTier erected on a roof to warn employee-s that they are approaching 
an unprotected roof side or edge, and which designates an area in which roofing work may take 
place without the u-se of guardrail, body belt, or safety net systems to protect employees in the 
area. 
Witness Statements: A verbal or written statement from a Witness that describes his/her account 
including a description of the sequence of events, facts, condit-ions, and/or causes of the mishap, 
which is considered privileged and is only releasable to the investigating authority and not the 
public or other government agencies unless release i-s ordered by a court of law. 
Witness: A person who has information, evidence, or proof about a mishap and provides his/her 
knowledge of the facts to the investigating authority. 
Acronym-s and Abbreviations 
ACM - Acces-s Control Monitor 
AHJ - Authority Having Jurisdiction 
CFR - Code of Federal Regulations 
CoP - Construction of Facilities - 
CT - Crawler Tran-sporter
CTC - Chief Test Conductor 
ET - External Tank 
HRI - Hamilton Roofing Inc. 
JR - Infrared 
JCCC - Joint Conmiunication Control Center 
KCCS - Kennedy Complex Control System 
KDP—P - Kennedy Documented Procedure - Procedure 
KDP-F - Kennedy Documented Procedure - Form 
KNPR - Kennedy NASA Procedural Requirements 
KSC - Kennedy Space Center 
LBS - Load Break Switch 
LCC - Launch Control Center 
MLP - Mobile Launcher Platform 
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NFPA - National Fire Protection Association 
NPR - NASA Procedural Requirements 
NTD - NASA Test Director 
OTS - Operational Intercommunication System 
OPF - Orbiter Processing Facility 
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
OTC - Orbiter Test Conductor 
OV- Orbiter Vehicle 
PAFB - Patrick Air Force Base
PLC - Programmable Logic Controller 
SBS •Styrene-Butadiene-Styrene 
SGS - Space Gateway Support 
SPDMS - Shuttle Processing Data Management System 
SRB - Solid Rocket Booster 
SRM - Solid Rocket Motor 
SS - Substation 
UA - Utility Annex 
UPS - Uninterruptible Power System 
USA - United Space Alliance 
USS - Unit Substations 
VAB - Vehicle Assembly Building 
VFI - Vacuum Fault Interrupt
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310 Quadral Drive 
Wadsworth. Ohio 44281 
330-334-0066 
330-334-4289 Fax 
February 2, 2005 
Tom Brophy 
Space Gateway Support LLC 
P. 0. Box 21237 M/CSGS 127 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32815 
Re: VAB Building 
M & N Level 
Soprema Roofing 
Dear Tom: 
This will reference the following issues, which have been discussed: 
1. Soprema has a 25-year plus history in manufacturing its SBS roof materials. 
2. Hamilton Roofing is a certified Soprema installer and has been enrolled in Soprema's 
program for over 10 years. 
3. Soprema's setf adhered flashing systems and adhesive bonded flashing systems 
meet its 20-year warranty program requirements. 
4. Hamilton Roofing personnel have been fully trained and certified to install torch 
applied systems by Soprema. The following is the list of personnel who have been 
trained and certified: 
Tony Hamilton Albaro Zamora 
Louis Smith Jose Garcia 
Shawn Smith Ricardo Hamilton 
Willie Williams Juan Ambriz 
Alvin Waite Chris Glynn 
David Wright Arturo Moreno 
Harlen Williams Jorge Magna
Please review and advise whether you have any questions. 
L. J. Rauktis 
Regional Manager 
HAMILTON 
ROOFING 
INCORPORATED 
7065 Osage Street, Palm Bay, FL 32909	 TEL: (321) 729-0548 FAX: (321) 725-
2029 
P. 0. Box 500590. Malabar, Florida 32950 	 email: 
hamiltonroofrng@usa.net 
February 4, 2005 
Space Gateway Support, LLC 
P.O. Box 21237 
Kennedy Space Center, FL 328 15-0237 
Attn.: Mr. Rich Scredon 
RE:	 Hamilton Roofing Personnel Training Procedures 
Our manufacturers have trained Hamilton Roofing's key people in Torch Down Roofing and Hot Asphalt Applied 
Roofing. Our newly hired employees and or employees that have progressed in experience have been taught those 
same procedures by our key people with an "on the job program". 
Hamilton Roofing's employees are also taught Safety Awareness which consist of afi phases of roofmg. In addition 
to our safety meetings we have weekly toolbox safety meetings, which are held on the job site. 
Also, please be advised that on February 15, 2005, Hamilton Roofing and our forernans ill be attending a CERTA 
training the trainer class put on by NRCA & CNA Insurance. This is a ten-hour class to certify our foremans to train 
the people under them to CNA Insurance standards. CERTA is national Torch Applied Application Certification 
that is offered by our insurance company for torch safety. We also have two inferred hand held guns that will be 
used on all jobs by the foremans. We are in the process of purchasing an inferred camera to be used in lieu of the 
guns. I have been in contact with Kathryn Knettel of your organization to help us in the purchase of this inferred 
camera. 
If I can be of any further assistance please feel free to call me at 321-427-8700. 
Respectfully, 
Anthony Hamilton 
President
SGS Interim Specifications 
Sample Specification Requirements 
1.1 Torch Applied (Heat Weld,) Modfied Bitumen Membrane Safety 
SBS Modified Bitumen Products applied at KCS and CCAFS may require the use of an open 
flame propane torch. Improper use of these materials and application equipment can result n 
severe bums, and/or other physical injury, as well as damage to property. In order to prevent 
these situations, the mechanic must install the materials using the techniques recommended by 
"A Guide to Safety: Torch-On Modified Bitumens" available from the (ARMA) Asphalt Roofing 
Manufacturers Association. These techniques have been endorsed by the National Roofing 
Contractors Association and the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers. 
1. 1.1 Protection of Property 
• 1.1.1 Protective Coverings 
In-stall protective coverings (i.e. fire retardant blankets and/or shield) at building walls, eaves, 
parapets and equipment curbs constructed of combustible materials within 3 feet of the area of 
work prior to commencing the work. Lap protective coverings not less than six inches and 
secure against wind. Keep protective coverings in place for the duration of the roofing work. 
.1.1.2 Applicator's Certification 
The Roofing contractor must ensure that all mechanics or applicators involved with the 
application of heat welded modified bitumen are properly trained not only in application and 
equipment handling, but safety measures. The contractor should verify that all roofing. 
applicators involved with open flame application maintain and carry a valid Certified Roofing 
Torch Applicator ("CERTA") card as evidence of proper training. 
1.1.1.3 Open Flame Application Equipment 
Torches and other open flame equipment shall be specifically designated for use in application of 
modified bitumen and approved by the modified bitumen sheet manufacturer. Open flame 
equipment shall not be ignited (burning) when left unattended. Provide and maintain a fire 
extinguisher adjacent to open flame equipment on the roof. Specific requirements for fire 
watches and burn permits exist. These requirements will be outlined at the pre-roofing 
conference. 
1.1.1.4 Fire Watch 
Provide fire watch personnel during torch application and continue for one hour after completion 
of torch application. 
Provide at least one certified infrared heat detection gun per torch for use during the fire watch to 
verify cool, safe and a non-combustible conditions exist. 
Provide at least two 2 gallon containers of water and two 20 pound ABC (dry chemical) 
extinguishers per torch for use during the fire watch. 
Check all fire extinguisher-s prior to and at the completion of the day's work to make sure they 
are full and operable.
1.1.1.5 Materials at the Jobsite 
Stored flammable materials, materials covered with shrink wraps, materials covered with craft 
paper andlor tarps should kept a minimum of 35 feet from all orchIwelding applications. 
Combustible materials requiring direct covering by the Torch-On Modified Bitumen-s system, 
shall be installed as specified in Division 7 Section 07550 "Modified Bituminous Membrane 
Roofing" unless specified or recommended otherwise as per manufacturer's printed application 
instructions, NRCA CD, NRCA R&W Manual for "cold adhered" materials over the combustible 
roof materials. 
1. 1.1.6 Windy Conditions 
During applications, where cross wind-s are occurring, the u-se of torching machines with side 
shield-s shall be used to prevent flame distortion of the end burners. 
Torch machine equipment with bottom shield plate shall be used to prevent the flame spread on 
to roof deck and substrate. 
Where heavy wind gust of 15mph are present the u-se of all torching equipment shall cease and 
desist until wind gust condition-s come to an end and/or notification form the safety engineer.
U
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Lessons Learned 
018.0 Observation: 
KDP—KSC-P-1474, Mishap Investigation Board" and KDP-KSC-F-1474. "Mishap 
Investigation Report" are not consistent with NPR 8621. IA, "NASA Procedural Requirements 
for Mishap Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping", dated February 11, 2004. 
(NOTE: KDP-KSC-P-1474 and KDP-KSC-F-1474 do not address proximate causes or ex-officio 
board members which are addressed in NPR 8621. IA. KDP-KSC-F- 1474 makes reference to 
NPD 8621.1 and NPG 8621.1, neither of which exists today.) 
018.1 Recommendation: 
Revise KDP-P-1474 and KDP-F-1474 to be consistent with the requirements of NPR 862 1.1A. 
019.0 Observation: 
Logistical and administrative support, and .training identified in KDP-P-1 474 were not provided. 
019.1 Recommendation: 
Provide the following resources to all Mishap Investigation Boards: 
1. A secure roonilfacility in which to conduct the investigation. This room should have a 
cipher lock to allow access for all board members. Items to be provided in the meeting 
room should include: 
a. At least one up-to-date computer with Microsoft Office products, full internet 
access, CD reader and CD writer, black and white and color high speed printers 
b. Computer projection of the computer listed above to allow group reviews 
c. Standard workstation with full internet access to allow board member.s to conduct 
on-line research and check e-mail 
d. Routine office supplies (binders, folders, pens, pencils, stapler, paper clips, 
dictionary, post-it notes, etc.) 
e. High speed copier 
f. Speaker phone with conference calling capability 
g. Fax machine 
2.	 Digital camera 
3.	 Voice recording equipment (recorder and blank media) and transcription service 
to facilitate the witness interview proces.s. 
019.2 Recommendation: 
Develop a training session on board procedures and present it to all Mi.shap Investigation 
Board members within 48 hours of appointment. Board Chairperson and Ex-Officio shall 
have applicable training prior to appointment.
